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MAYER V. MONROE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 






Cite as: Justin Nemunaitis, Mayer v. Monroe: The Seventh Circuit Sheds Freedom of 






The Supreme Court has had a difficult time resolving First 
Amendment disputes in the public school setting. The Court has 
frequently reiterated that teachers and students do not “shed their 
Constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”1 Nonetheless, schools must be able to maintain 
some control over their classrooms because “[i]n no activity of the 
State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.”2 
Not surprisingly, lower courts have had trouble navigating these 
conflicting interests, and as a result, this area of the law can be quite 
difficult to predict.3  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S. Mathematics, May 2005, University of Texas-Austin. I would like 
to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris, Julia Lissner, Matthew McQuiston and Tracy 
Mendonides for their invaluable help in writing this Note. 
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
2 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). 
3 See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4-6 (2001). 
1
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In Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corp., the 
Seventh Circuit recently scaled back the protection afforded to the 
classroom speech of public school teachers.4 A school dismissed a 
teacher, after she mentioned to her students that she honked her horn 
while driving past individuals protesting the war in Iraq.5 The court 
ruled that teachers’ opinions are not protected by the First Amendment 
when expressed in the classroom.6 This decision implicitly overruled 
previous precedent by applying a stricter test to teacher classroom 
speech.7 
Federal courts are currently split over what test to apply when 
evaluating a teacher’s classroom speech. The First, Second, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits8 treat this speech as classroom speech governed by 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.9 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, D.C., and now Seventh Circuits10 treat this speech as public 
employee speech governed by Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205.11 The Supreme Court has not yet 
                                                 
4 (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, Mayer v. 
Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 06-1993, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7157 (7th 
Cir. Mar. 12, 2007). 
5 Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478. 
6 Id. at 480. 
7 See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
8 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991). 
9 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
10 See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478; Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 
F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001); Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 
372-73 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Some of these 
decisions do not cite directly to Pickering. Rather, they cite to some other case in 
that line such as Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
11 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
764 
resolved this split—although it could have addressed the issue in its 
recent decision Garcetti v. Ceballos.12  
Despite the controversy surrounding this issue, the Seventh 
Circuit has not explained why it prefers one test over the other. This 
Note will attempt to fill that gap. Part I will explain how a circuit split 
has developed around these three Supreme Court decisions. Part II will 
explain what the Seventh Circuit has contributed to this debate with 
Mayer. Part III will examine practical problems created by Mayer. Part 
IV will analyze the various tests that the Seventh Circuit could have 
applied in Mayer. Finally, Part V will argue that the court should have 
maintained its earlier practice of evaluating teacher classroom speech 
under Hazelwood. 
 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Supreme Court Precedents 
 
When analyzing teacher classroom speech, courts must choose 
between two different lines of Supreme Court precedent. The first 
focuses on public employee speech, and the second focuses on school 
speech. 
 
1. The Pickering Line of Cases 
 
In Pickering, a public high school teacher wrote a letter to the 
local newspaper opposing a bond proposal to raise school funds.13 The 
letter accused the school board of diverting too much money to 
athletics and threatening teachers who opposed the bond proposal.14 
After the school board fired the teacher, he filed a § 1983 action 
against the school board claiming that his First Amendment right to 
expression had been infringed.15 The Supreme Court explained that 
                                                 
12 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
13 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 564-65. 
3
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government employees do not lose their Constitutional rights simply 
by accepting government paychecks.16 Nonetheless, the government 
needs some control over the speech of its employees to promote the 
efficiency of public services.17  
The Supreme Court developed a two part test two resolve this 
tension: (1) a court must determine whether a public employee’s 
speech touches upon “matters of public concern;” (2) if so, the court 
must balance the free speech interests of the employee against the 
government’s interest as an employer.18 If the speech does not touch 
on a matter of public concern it is unprotected, and the employee’s 
claim will fail.19  
The bond issue in Pickering was the subject of considerable 
public debate at the time, so the Court moved on to the second part of 
the test, balancing the interests of the teacher and the school board. 
The teacher had an interest in contributing his opinion to the public 
debate, and the public had an interest in receiving as much information 
as possible regarding this important decision.20 The school board, on 
the other hand, suffered no detriment because of the letter. It was 
written after the proposal had been defeated at the polls and, as far as 
the Court could tell, the public greeted it with “massive apathy and 
total disbelief.”21 Since the school board brought forth no evidence 
that the letter created any disruption, or hindered the school’s attempt 
to raise funds, the teacher’s speech was protected.22 Accordingly, he 
had been wrongfully discharged.23 
Subsequent decisions have clarified this complicated test. For 
example, the government may still retaliate against the protected 
                                                 
16 See id. at 568. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 572-73. This second step is commonly referred to as the “Pickering 
balancing test.” 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 571-72. 
21 Id. at 570. 
22 Id. at 572-73. 
23 Id. at 574-75. 
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speech of a public employee if it has an independent basis for 
discharge.24 In addition, the speech need not be broadcast to the 
public; speech directed only toward supervisors may also be 
protected.25  
The Supreme Court’s next major decision in this area, Connick v. 
Myers,26 narrowed the definition of “public concern.”27 An assistant 
district attorney was upset about being transferred to a different 
division. She circulated a questionnaire soliciting the views of her 
colleagues concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the level of 
confidence in supervisors, and whether they felt pressured to work in 
political campaigns.28 The trial court had held that this questionnaire 
addressed matters of public concern, but the Supreme Court 
reversed.29 After considering the “content, form, and context” of the 
employee’s speech, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
questionnaire was an outgrowth of a personal dispute.30 Although it 
addressed matters of public concern, the purpose of the questionnaire 
was simply to frustrate her supervisors.31 The Court refused to 
“constitutionalize” this employee grievance to discourage public 
employees from litigating minor personal disputes.32 Because Myers 
could not pass the first step of the Pickering test, the Court did not 
address the second step.33 
                                                 
24 See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1976) 
(explaining that the school board could not fire a teacher for distributing a memo to a 
local radio station, but it could fire him for obscene conduct directed toward faculty, 
staff, and students). 
25 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) 
(explaining that private speech between teacher and principal may be protected after 
the teacher criticized the school’s implementation of a desegregation order). 
26 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
27 See Daly, supra note 3, at 9. 
28 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141-42. 
29 Id. at 152. 
30 Id. at 148. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 154. 
33 See id. 
5
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Most recently, in Garcetti, the Supreme Court further narrowed 
the first step of the Pickering test.34 A deputy district attorney 
examined an affidavit used to procure a search warrant.35 He wrote a 
memo to his supervisor detailing serious misrepresentations made in 
the affidavit, but his supervisor refused to dismiss the case.36 After a 
heated discussion of this decision, the deputy was transferred to a 
different division; in response, the deputy sued.37 The Court ruled that 
although the memo touched upon matters of public concern, it was not 
protected because it was written pursuant to the employee’s duty as a 
calendar deputy.38 When a government employee is speaking within 
the scope of his employment duties, he is not speaking as a citizen, 
and hence has no First Amendment protection.39  
In light of Connick and Garcetti, a government employee must 
now satisfy a new test to prevail on a First Amendment claim. The 
employee must show that (1) the speech, considered in context,40 
touches upon “matters of public concern,” and is outside the scope of 
employment;41 (2) if so, the free speech interests of the employee must 
outweigh government’s interest as an employer.42 Although the 
language of Garcetti is broad enough to apply to all public employees, 
the Court explicitly declined to decide if this same test applies to cases 
involving “speech related to scholarship or teaching.”43 
 
                                                 
34 See Krystal LoPilato, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First 
Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 537 (2006). 
35 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006). 
36 Id. at 1955. 
37 Id. at 1956. 
38 Id. at 1960. 
39 Id. 
40 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
41 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1962. 
6
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2. The Hazelwood Line of Cases 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently applied specialized analysis 
for speech occurring in school settings.44 The seminal case on school 
speech is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, in which the Court protected students’ right to wear black 
armbands protesting the Vietnam War.45 Justice Fortas famously 
proclaimed “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”46 School authorities may censor classroom 
speech, but only after showing that the speech would “‘materially and 
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school.’”47  
Tinker was a first attempt at balancing free speech rights against 
the practical need to maintain discipline in an educational institution. 
The Court’s strong rhetoric against authoritarian limits on teacher and 
student expression encouraged lower courts to protect First 
Amendment rights in schools.48  
Subsequent decisions have tipped the scales further in favor of 
school authorities.49 For example, the Court elaborated in Bethel v. 
Fraser that a school may prevent a student from giving an obscene 
speech, and emphasized a school’s need to disassociate itself from 
inappropriate speech.50  
                                                 
44 See Frederick Schauer, The Thirteenth Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference 
On Constitutional Law: Horowitz, Churchill, Columbia—What Next For Academic 
Freedom?: Is There A Right To Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 908-
09 (2006). 
45 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
46 Id. at 506. 
47 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
48 See id. (“[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism”). 
49 See Daly, supra note 3, at 9. 
50 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). 
7
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The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in this line, 
Hazelwood, significantly narrowed the holding in Tinker.51 In 
Hazelwood, a high school principal removed several controversial 
articles from the student-written school newspaper.52 One article was 
removed because it discussed students’ experiences with pregnancy, 
and the principal worried that the article did not sufficiently conceal 
the students’ identities. The other article criticized a student’s father 
during divorce proceedings without giving the father a chance to 
explain his behavior.53  
Rather than simply applying the Tinker test, the Court used 
“forum analysis” to determine what test to apply.54 The Court first 
considered whether the school had opened up the newspaper as a 
public forum; if so, it would apply the Tinker test.55 It concluded that 
because the school reserved editorial control over the newspaper, it 
was a non-public forum for “school-sponsored” expression.56 It 
determined that a new test was necessary for this speech which “the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”57  
The new test allowed the school to censor school-sponsored 
speech so long as its actions are “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”58 The Court found that the school board had a 
legitimate interest in teaching appropriate journalism practice, i.e. 
protecting confidentiality of sources and allowing for even-handed 
debate. Because the articles deviated from that practice, the principal 
did not violate the First Amendment by removing them from the 
                                                 
51 See Daly, supra note 3, at 11. 
52 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 267. The Court had recently elaborated on this concept of 
differentiating between First Amendment claims based on the forum of the speech. 
See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
55 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73. 
56 Id. at 270. 
57 Id. at 271. 
58 Id. at 273. 
8
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school newspaper.59 The Court further explained that school 
authorities have a legitimate pedagogical interest in protecting students 
from speech that advocates drug use, irresponsible sex or conduct 
“inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order.’”60  
Although Hazelwood dealt with student speech, the test the Court 
articulated is broad enough to include teacher speech which is school-
sponsored.61 Accordingly, lower courts have disagreed over whether 
teacher classroom speech should be analyzed as government employee 
speech under Pickering, or school sponsored speech under 
Hazelwood.62  
 
B. Circuit Court Responses 
 
Although few courts have had the chance to address Garcetti, the 
Hazelwood/Pickering distinction has provided ample ground for 
disagreement between the circuits.63 Both lines of cases provide 
different tests for evaluating teacher classroom speech. Pickering 
protects teacher classroom speech that addresses matters of public 
concern.64 Hazelwood protects teacher classroom speech when the 
school board has no legitimate pedagogical reason for preventing the 
speech.65 These two very different tests do not always return the same 
results.66 While most circuits have decided to apply one test or the 
other, few have explained why.67 
                                                 
59 Id. at 272. 
60 Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).  
61 See Daly, supra note 3, at 62; Walter E. Kuhn, First Amendment Protection 
of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE L.J. 995, 1024 (2006). 
62 See Daly, supra note 3, at 16. 
63 See Daly, supra note 3, at 16-17. 
64 See 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). 
65 See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
66 See Daly, supra note 3, at 16-17. For example, suppose a math teacher asks 
students to identify practical uses for algebra in their everyday lives. Certainly there 
is a pedagogical reason for this assignment, but it does not touch upon matters of 
public concern. Alternatively, suppose that math teacher decides to discuss the war 
in Iraq instead of math. While this topic is a matter of public concern, the math 
9
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1. Circuit Courts that Apply Pickering 
 
At least two courts applying Pickering have determined 
categorically that classroom speech is never protected.68 In Boring v. 
Buncombe, a drama teacher directed a school play which the school 
principal felt violated the controversial materials policy.69 Although he 
initially approved the play, the principal later decided that the play was 
inappropriate. At the end of the year he requested that the teacher be 
transferred because of “personal conflicts.”70 The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that disputes over classroom speech are inherently private 
employment disputes.71 Thus, classroom speech never touches upon 
matters of public concern.72 This ruling effectively created a per se 
rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected. While this decision 
creates a clear rule, it did not properly analyze whether the teacher’s 
speech touched upon matters of public concern.73 
The Sixth Circuit applied the Pickering test more faithfully in 
Cockrel v. Shelby.74 An elementary school teacher invited Woody 
Harrelson to discuss legalization of industrialized hemp in her 
                                                                                                                   
teacher would have no legitimate pedagogical reason for refusing to teach math in 
math class. 
67 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. 
of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176-77 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). 
68 See Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 798. 
69 136 F.3d at 366. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 369. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 378-79 (Motz, J. dissenting). 
74 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001). 
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
772 
classroom.75 The principal initially approved this decision, but after 
several visits by the famous actor, national media attention, and 
numerous parents’ complaints, the principal fired the teacher.76 The 
court applied Pickering and first determined that because the 
controversial topic of industrialized hemp generated substantial public 
debate, it is a matter of public concern. The court recognized that a 
teacher may still speak about matters of public concern within the 
classroom, and criticized Boring for focusing on the location of the 
speech rather than the content of the speech.77  
The court next applied the second step of the Pickering test—
balancing the interests of the employee and the school.78 The court 
ruled that the balancing test weighed heavily in favor of the teacher. 
The teacher’s speech addressed a matter of significant public concern 
and the speech did nothing to hurt the efficiency of the workplace, or 
create disharmony among employees. Although several parents 
complained, these complaints had minimal impact on workplace 
efficiency.79 At least one Judge was particularly influenced by the fact 
that the school had initially authorized the visits.80 Thus, under 
Pickering, the teacher’s speech was protected.  
The Fourth Circuit will likely read Garcetti as validating its 
earlier decision because classroom speech is part of a teacher’s official 
duties. The Sixth Circuit may join the Fourth Circuit by adopting a per 
se rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected, or it may focus 
on Garcetti’s statement that the school setting is unique.81 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at 1042-43. 
76 Id. at 1042-45. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1054. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1060 (Siler, J. concurring). 
81 See id. at 1962. 
11
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2. Circuit Courts that Apply Hazelwood 
 
Courts applying Hazelwood have done so uniformly, i.e. there is 
no comparable split like the one between the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits. Under Hazelwood, a school may restrict teacher classroom 
speech to advance “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”82 Preservation 
of the school board’s accepted curriculum is one such concern, so a 
teacher has no First Amendment right to deviate from the 
curriculum.83 Teacher speech may be protected when it does not 
contradict the school’s curriculum.84 Thus, Courts applying 
Hazelwood have generally concluded that school boards have wide 
latitude to set curricula, but must give teachers adequate notice of 
speech restrictions.85 
In Ward v. Hickey a ninth grade biology teacher started a 
discussion over whether Down’s syndrome fetuses should be 
aborted.86 After a parent notified the school board of the discussion, 
the board voted to deny the teacher tenure, and he sued. The First 
Circuit ruled that the school board had a legitimate pedagogical 
interest in prohibiting such a controversial discussion.87 Nonetheless, 
the school board could only punish the teacher after notifying him that 
such a discussion is prohibited.88 In contrast, courts applying 
Pickering are not usually concerned with notice to the teachers.89 
                                                 
82 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New Lenox 
Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1990). 
83 See Ward, 996 F.2d at 452. 
84 See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 723; Ward, 996 F.2d at 454; Webster, 917 F.2d at 
1007. 
85 See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 723; Ward, 996 F.2d at 452. 
86 996 F.2d at 450. 
87 Id. at 453. 
88 Id. at 452. 
89 See Mayer v. Monroe (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007); Boring 
v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v. 
12
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C. The Seventh Circuit Response 
 
The Seventh Circuit initially followed those courts applying 
Hazelwood to teacher classroom speech. In Webster v. New Lenox 
School District No. 122, a teacher refused to teach evolution and chose 
to teach creation science instead.90 Despite complaints from school 
authorities, the teacher simply refused to follow the curriculum.91 The 
Seventh Circuit analyzed his claim under Hazelwood. Like the other 
courts applying Hazelwood, it ruled that a school board has a 
legitimate pedagogical interest in ensuring that teachers do not create 
their own curricula.92 Accordingly, the teacher had no First 
Amendment right to discuss creation science in the classroom.93 While 
school authorities may not fire teachers for “random classroom 
comments,” they may fire a teacher who refuses to teach the set 
curriculum.94  
The Seventh Circuit applied Pickering in employment dispute 
cases involving non-classroom teacher speech. The court applied this 
analysis when a university professor sexually harassed female students 
at a conference off campus,95 and when a high school teacher wrote 
articles for a local newspaper criticizing the school board.96 In both 
those cases the teachers had claimed First Amendment protection for 
their speech.97 
                                                                                                                   
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 
1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see Cockrel v. Shelby, 270 F.3d 1036, 1060 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (Siler, J. concurring). 
90 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990). 
91 Id. at 1006. 
92 Id. at 1008. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1007-08. 
95 See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F. 3d 878, 881-84 (7th Cir. 2003). 
96 See Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1996). 
97 Trejo, 319 F. 3d at 884; Dishnow, 77 F.3d at 197. 
13
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The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to re-visit teacher 
classroom speech in Piggee v. Sandburg.98 Piggee, a cosmetology 
teacher at a community college, placed anti-homosexual pamphlets in 
the pocket of one student at the end of class. The student, who was 
homosexual, was deeply offended by the pamphlets.99 At the end of 
the year, the teacher’s contract was not renewed.100 Ignoring Webster, 
the court discussed the first step of the Pickering test—whether or not 
the speech touched upon a matter of public concern, and was outside 
the scope of her employment.101 The court determined that the 
discussion of homosexual behavior “richly deserves public 
attention.”102 Furthermore, the speech was outside the scope of 
Piggee’s employment because she was hired to teach cosmetology not 
proselytize against homosexuality.103 Nonetheless, the court refused to 
move onto the second step of the Pickering test.104 Instead, it decided 
that the Pickering test was simply inappropriate for teacher classroom 
speech. The court described a new test: a school can prohibit 
“nongermane” speech that “could impede the school’s educational 
mission.”105 
This decision is difficult to interpret in light of the circuit split 
surrounding this issue. The Seventh Circuit seems to have rejected its 
earlier decisions and aligned itself with the circuits that apply 
Pickering to cases involving teacher classroom speech. However, 
Piggee does not follow Boring v. Buncombe because it refused to 
                                                 
98 See 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006). 
99 Id. at 669 (Specifically, he “did not appreciate being called an abomination, 
a child molester, or a rapist and a deviant”). 
100 Id. at 669. 
101 Id. at 670-71. 
102 Id. at 671-72. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 672 (“The real question, however, is whether the college had a right to 
insist that Piggee refrain from engaging in that particular speech while serving as an 
instructor of cosmetology”).  
105 Id. at 672. The court offered little explanation of where this test comes 
from, and it does not cite to any previous opinion. See id. 
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create a per se rule that teacher classroom speech is unprotected.106 It 
does not follow Cockrel v. Shelby because it refused to move onto the 
second step of the Pickering test.107 Although much of the discussion 
in Piggee concerns Pickering, the holding of the case is consistent 
with the Seventh Circuit’s earlier precedent applying Hazelwood, i.e. 
the court required the school to justify its employment decision by 
showing some sort of educational concern.108 
 
II. MAYER V. MONROE COUNTY COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP. 
 
If Piggee left doubts about which line of Supreme Court 
precedent to apply in cases involving teacher classroom speech, Mayer 
v. Monroe answered them. This decision firmly aligns the Seventh 
Circuit with those courts that have created a per se rule that teacher 
classroom speech is unprotected.109 The case is very short, and the 
compelling story leading up to the litigation is condensed into a 
paragraph. Luckily, the district court preserved much of the factual 
background.110 
 
A. The District Court Opinion 
 
In August of 2002, Mayer signed a one-year contract with the 
Monroe School Board to teach a current events class for fourth-sixth 
graders.111 She relied on approved material such as the current events 
                                                 
106 Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671 (“[c]lassroom or instructional speech, in short, is 
inevitably speech that is part of the instructor’s official duties, even though at the 
same time the instructor’s freedom to express her views on the assigned course is 
protected”). 
107 Id. at 672. 
108 Compare id., with Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 
1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990). 
109 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 478 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
110 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-
VSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *4-*27 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
111 Id. at *5 n.1. 
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magazine, “Time for Kids” (“TFK”), to teach the class. On January 10, 
2003, TFK contained information on the war in Iraq and related 
protests.112 After discussing the article, one student asked Ms. Mayer if 
she would ever march in a protest. She responded that peace protests 
are going on all over the country including Bloomington, and “[w]hen 
I drive past the courthouse square and the demonstrators are picketing 
I honk my horn for peace because their sign says ‘Honk for Peace.’”113 
She further explained that it is important for everyone to seek out 
peaceful solutions even on the playground. The class then moved on to 
discuss other material.114 
Soon afterward, one parent complained and the school principal 
held a meeting with the parent and Ms. Mayer. All three agreed that 
Ms. Mayer should “not mention peace in her class again.”115 The next 
day, the principal circulated a memo to the school teachers informing 
everyone that the school had no official stance on the war in Iraq. He 
also cancelled “Peace Month,” an annual tradition supporting peaceful 
resolution of problems.116 After the school district refused to renew her 
contract, Mayer sued.117 The district court engaged in Pickering 
analysis and granted summary judgment for the school board after it 
determined that Mayer was speaking as a public employee rather than 
a citizen.118  
 
                                                 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 Id. at *6 
114 Id. at *6. 
115 Id. at *7. 
116 Id. at *9. 
117 Id. at *26. Although both Mayer I and Mayer II focused on the First 
Amendment issue, the district court detailed numerous other complaints against Ms. 
Mayer which, if true, could have independently justified her termination. Id. at *9-
*26. Because Mayer disputed these complaints, the court ignored them at the 
summary judgment stage. 
118 Id. at *39. 
16
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B. The Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Less than a month after the district court issued its opinion, the 
Supreme Court decided Garcetti, which denies First Amendment 
protection to public employees acting pursuant to official duties.119 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that if Garcetti applies then “the school 
district prevails without further ado.”120 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion focuses on whether Mayer’s speech occurred pursuant to an 
official duty.121 
The court first looked at its earlier teacher classroom speech case, 
Webster.122 It mentions this case simply for the proposition that 
teachers must follow the rules set by school authorities.123 A teacher 
must stick to the prescribed curriculum, so a literature teacher cannot 
choose what books to teach and a math teacher cannot decide to teach 
calculus in place of trigonometry.124 Part of the rationale for this rule is 
that teachers can be powerful influences in students’ lives; the power 
to decide what students hear must rest in the hands of elected 
officials.125 The court concluded that Mayer presented “personal views 
to captive audiences against the instructions of elected officials.”126  
This comment is unusual because no elected official instructed 
Mayer that her comments were outside the curriculum until after she 
made them.127 In fact, since she was commenting on approved 
material, her comments were likely within the prescribed curriculum. 
                                                 
119 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960-61 (2006). 
120 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 479 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 479 (“This is so in part because the school system does not “regulate” 
teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech”). 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 480. 
126 Id. 
127 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-
VSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *4-*7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
17
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While this point is arguable, the court simply assumes that Mayer 
disobeyed school authorities.128  
The court next distinguished Piggee by stating that proselytizing 
was not part of Piggee’s teaching duties, but Mayer’s current events 
class was an assigned task.129 Thus, the court need not apply Piggee’s 
“germaneness” test because Garcetti applies directly—Mayer had no 
first amendment right to express an opinion on current events in 
current events class. The court concluded by holding, “the first 
amendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when 
conducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or 
advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the 
school.”130 Although the court qualified its holding by stating that 
teacher speech is only proscribed when it departs from the curriculum, 
this qualification is meaningless because the court never explained 
why Mayer’s comments departed from the curriculum. She covered a 
topic adopted in the school curriculum—the Iraq war—and advocated 
a position which the school had annually celebrated until the day after 
her comments—peaceful resolution of conflicts. Even if Mayer’s 
statements did depart from the curriculum, they did so only after the 
school informed Mayer that her statements were inappropriate.131 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit allows school boards to change the 
curriculum post hoc, and then fire a teacher for making comments that 
were acceptable at the time they were made. 
 
III. PROBLEMS WITH MAYER V. MONROE COUNTY  
COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORP. 
 
The Seventh Circuit has created a per se rule that teachers have no 
right to express opinions in the classroom, even if the school board 
                                                 
128 Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 480. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See Mayer I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *37-*38 (stating that it is 
irrelevant when the school board prohibited Mayer’s speech because she never had a 
First Amendment right to express any opinion in the classroom). 
18
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initially approves the opinions. This rule creates numerous practical 
problems.132 The court intended that this bright-line rule minimize 
costly litigation over employment disputes, and clarify that school 
boards, not teachers, control the curriculum.133 Unfortunately, the rule 
favors school boards too much: it encourages school boards to bend to 
the whims of vocal parents and use teachers as scapegoats; it 
discourages teachers from developing creative lesson plans; and it 
threatens teachers’ rights outside the classroom. 
As Mayer illustrates, school boards are bombarded by constant 
pressure from parents.134 While the school board has a responsibility 
to respect the wishes of the community, it must do so in a way 
consistent with the Constitution.135 For example, a school board 
cannot decide to teach creationism instead of evolution simply because 
a vocal group of parents complain.136 Similarly, a school board should 
not dismiss good teachers simply because a handful of parents have 
idiosyncratic objections. Other circuits protect teachers from this sort 
of whimsical removal by requiring school boards to offer some sort of 
                                                 
132 See, e.g., Daly, supra note 3, at 28-31 (discussing problems created by the 
per se rules of Boring v. Buncombe and similar cases). 
133 See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 478-79. 
134 Mayer I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *4-*27; Liz Babiarz, School 
Board to study turnover; Board wants to learn why superintendents do not stay, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 2006 at BS1 (noting that community pressure 
is one of the primary reasons superintendents have been leaving the local school 
board).  
135 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“Local School Boards may not remove books 
from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those 
books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion’”); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 
F.2d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1985) (rev’d on other grounds by Memphis Cmty. Sch. 
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (criticizing a school board for not defending a 
teacher against parents protesting the school board’s curriculum).  
136 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 (1987). 
19
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justification for their employment decisions.137 In these circuits, school 
boards must explain to even the most irate parents that they cannot 
arbitrarily remove teachers.138 Under Mayer, teachers no longer have 
this protection because a school board can justify any employment 
decision by pointing to a teacher’s classroom speech, even if the 
speech was pre-approved.139 District courts in these circuits are left 
with no choice but to dismiss the teachers’ claims.140  
Because pre-approval confers no protection on teachers, Mayer 
actually encourages school boards to use teachers as scapegoats when 
parents object to classroom speech.141 Suppose a teacher seeks 
approval for discussing a certain topic in class, which might upset a 
small minority of parents in the community. A principal outside the 
Seventh Circuit would have to weigh the educational benefits of the 
discussion against the potential parental backlash. If the backlash will 
be substantial, the principal will protect the reputation of the school by 
disallowing the discussion. In the Seventh Circuit, a principal could 
approve the discussion, and then if the parents become upset, the 
                                                 
137 Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 
1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. 
Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991). 
138 See, e.g., Stachura, 763 F.2d at 214-15. 
139 See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 
480 (7th Cir. 2007). 
140 Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (D. Va. 2006) 
(granting summary judgment to school after applying Boring); Erskine v. Bd. of 
Educ., 207 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D. Md. 2002) (dismissing teacher’s claim); 
Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677, 684 (D. Va. 2000) (refusing to grant 
preliminary injunction to keep teacher’s pamphlets available to students). 
141 See, e.g., Stachura, 763 F.2d at 214-15; cf. Kara Lynn Grice, Striking an 
Unequal Balance: The Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School Teachers Do Not 
Have First Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County 
Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960, 2005-06 (1999) (arguing that excessive 
deference granted to school boards destroys the balance between school authorities 
and teachers). 
20
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principal could fire the teacher as a scapegoat.142 Even worse, the 
school board could fire a teacher who simply taught the prescribed 
curriculum, which happens to upset a group of parents.  
While this example may seem far-fetched, a few district courts 
have already allowed this to happen. In Stachura v. Truszkowski, a 
teacher taught a sex education course approved by the principal and 
school board.143 After a few parents complained, the school board 
suspended the teacher, ignoring the fact that it had created the class. A 
district court upheld the school board’s decision, and as a result, the 
teacher suffered through years of harassment from the community and 
enmity from the national media.144 The Sixth Circuit later reversed the 
district court and ruled that the school board could not fire him for 
simply doing his job.145 In Erskine v. Board of Education a teacher was 
fired for writing the Spanish word for black, “negro,” on the board 
during a Spanish lesson on colors.146 A district court in the Fourth 
Circuit, reasoned that under, Boring v. Buncombe, the word was a part 
of the lesson plan, thus it was per se unprotected speech.147 Teachers in 
the Seventh Circuit can now look forward to a similar fate. 
While some teachers may feel the sting of Mayer after they have 
been fired, most teachers will feel its effects in the classroom. Most 
schools encourage teachers to develop creative lesson plans and find 
new ways to connect with students.148 Historically, courts have granted 
limited protection to these efforts by requiring schools to justify 
                                                 
142 See Mayer II, 474 F.3d at 480. 
143 Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1985) (rev’d on other 
grounds by Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)). 
144 Stachura, 763 F.2d at 213-14. 
145 Id. at 214-15. 
146 207 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D. Md. 2002) 
147 Id. The court expressed doubt that the teacher was actually dismissed for 
this incident, but it assumed the truth of the teacher’s assertion for purposes of 
summary judgment. Id. at 409-410. 
148 See Magnet School a Family Affair, HERALD & REVIEW, Apr. 3, 2007; Give 
Teachers Flexibility, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 28, 2007 at A8. 
21
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actions against teachers.149 Because Mayer completely removes this 
protection, it strongly discourages teachers from developing creative 
teaching methods or even explaining difficult concepts in their own 
words.150  
Teachers may even experience this chilling effect outside the 
classroom.151 Mayer holds that the First Amendment does not protect a 
teacher’s speech when the teacher is “conducting the education of 
captive audiences.”152 Just when does a teacher stop teaching? May a 
teacher express an opinion to students who linger in the classroom 
after hours? During lunch break? During a school event such as a 
sporting event or reception? While the court need not answer these 
questions now, the prospects for teachers do not look promising.153 
To some extent, these questions are natural reactions to the 
Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision,154 rather than to Mayer. But the 
line between personal and professional life is much blurrier for 
teachers than for district attorneys.155 Society encourages teachers to 
connect with their students and inspire them, and popular culture 
celebrates teachers with creative and inspirational methods. 
 
                                                 
149 Donald F. Uerling, Academic Freedom in K-12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REV. 
956, 966 (2000) (listing cases). 
150 Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words In The Classroom: Teaching The Limits Of 
The First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597, 600 (1999). 
151 See Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667, 671 (2006) (explaining that the 
instructor/student relationship does not end the moment class is over). 
152 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 480 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
153 See Tracy F. Mendonides, Speak No Evil? The Seventh Circuit Limits 
Speech Rights of Government Employees, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 667 (2007), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-2/mendonides.pdf (arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s 
broad interpretation of Garcetti threatens the First Amendment rights of public 
employees). 
154 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1968 (Souter, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority opinion invites litigation over whether an employees 
comments were made pursuant to official duties). 
155 See id. at 1970 (Souter, J. dissenting); Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671. 
22
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TESTS AVAILABLE TO THE MAYER COURT 
 
Mayer ignores several judicial tests that it could have applied. 
Besides Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit could have applied traditional 
Pickering analysis, Hazelwood analysis, Piggee analysis, or some 
other test. 
 
A. The Garcetti Rule 
 
Although Garcetti preserves the opportunity for circuit courts to 
apply different tests in the school setting,156 the Seventh Circuit adopts 
it without much discussion. The Supreme Court was concerned that 
the school setting presents different interests which may require 
further analysis,157 but Mayer does not address this concern. 
Unfortunately, this concern is well founded because teacher-student 
communication is very different from communication between fellow 
employees. 
Garcetti attempts to resolve a conflict between an employee’s 
right to criticize an employer, and the government’s need to operate 
effectively and efficiently.158 It promotes workplace efficiency by 
minimizing the government’s role in employment litigation. The 
Supreme Court did not want to chill supervisors from terminating 
incompetent or uncooperative employees out of fear that termination 
would lead to a time consuming lawsuit.159 Suppose a police officer 
expresses to her supervisor that his plan for allocating officers will 
fail, and the supervisor immediately fires the officer for doubting 
him.160 While termination in this case may be a petty managerial 
decision, Garcetti over-protects the supervisor.161 Without Garcetti, 
the supervisor might be forced to work with uncooperative officers out 
                                                 
156 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. 
157 See id. at 1969-70 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
158 See id. at 1958. 
159 See id. at 1961. 
160 See Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006). 
161 See id. at 648. 
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of fear that termination could lead to a lawsuit. Garcetti over-protects 
supervisors from retaliation for petty employment decisions so they 
don’t need to justify every employment decision to a court. 
There is no comparable need for over-protection in the education 
context. While an employer may need to promote workplace 
efficiency by removing uncooperative employees, school boards can 
protect students by setting the curriculum and explaining it to 
teachers.162 They should not be chilled from firing teachers for 
inappropriate classroom expression because they can protect students 
by first instructing teachers to remain on topic.163 If a teacher ignores 
the school board and continues to expose children to inappropriate 
material, the school board can fire the teacher for insubordination.164  
Mayer also ignores key legal distinctions in Garcetti. The 
Supreme Court stated that “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence 
to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe 
any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”165 
This pronouncement is inappropriate in an academic context. In the 
university setting, a political theory professor’s writings and speeches 
may be made pursuant to official duties. Nonetheless, that professor 
still has a First Amendment right to criticize the government.166 While 
this argument is less persuasive for primary and secondary teachers, 
                                                 
162 See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
163 This argument relies on the fact that almost all schools maintain conduct 
guidelines. For example, the biology curriculum need not specify that the teacher 
should not use profanity because this obvious rule is in the school’s code of conduct. 
See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that the school had given the teacher sufficient notice of 
proscribed conduct by specifying conduct in the “Student Discipline Code,” among 
other things). 
164 See Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008. 
165 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
166 See id. (Souter, J. dissenting) at 1969-70. 
24
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the Seventh Circuit does not always distinguish between these two 
settings.167  
By applying Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit has given school 
authorities an axe where a scalpel would be more appropriate. School 
authorities may now remove any teacher without cause simply by 
stating that classroom speech was the reason for removal.168 While this 
axe may be used to protect impressionable children, it may also have 
the undesirable effect of discouraging any teacher creativity or 
spontaneity.169  
Because Garcetti is not concerned with protecting students from 
inappropriate material, it is completely inappropriate for teacher 
classroom speech cases. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s language in 
Garcetti is broad enough to apply in these cases.170 Because this case 
is a natural extension of Pickering, most courts that apply Pickering 
will probably adopt Garcetti for teacher classroom speech cases. 
 
B. The Pickering Public Concern Test 
 
Because Pickering dealt with substantially similar facts, it 
presents the same difficulties as applying Garcetti to teacher 
classroom speech. Nonetheless, four circuits have already decided to 
apply Pickering in this setting.171 Unfortunately, only the Fourth 
                                                 
167 See Julia R. Lissner, Stop the Presses! Seventh Circuit Censors College 
Student Media, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 182, 182-83 (2006), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/lissner.pdf. 
168 See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 
479 (7th Cir. 2007). 
169 See Weiner, supra note 150, at 600. 
170 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. 
171 Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Boring v. Buncombe Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998); Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 1989); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 
1169, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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Circuit has acknowledged the circuit split and offered reasons for its 
decision to apply Pickering.172  
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Boring v. Buncombe involved a 
drama teacher who was punished for producing a school play that 
violated the school’s controversial materials policy.173 The court 
categorically denied protection to official teacher speech. The Boring 
majority explained that its primary concern was to ensure that the 
school board, not teachers, controlled the curriculum.174 The court 
applied Pickering because it specifically dealt with public employee 
speech, while Hazelwood dealt with student speech.175 In addition, 
Hazelwood would force courts to make curricular decisions which 
should rest with the school board.176 The court worried that teachers 
could harass school officials by requiring them to justify every 
curricular decision in court. This result would be un-democratic 
because each judge would have a different opinion about what a 
legitimate pedagogical concern is.177 This argument is not specific to 
Hazelwood because school boards may be equally burdened by 
arguing that a teacher’s speech is not a matter of public concern.178  
The Pickering test is inappropriate in a school setting because it 
focuses on the wrong elements. The “public concern” element is ill 
suited for teacher classroom speech.179 This speech is neither ordinary 
workplace speech, nor public debate. It is not difficult to imagine such 
a test casting a “pall of orthodoxy over the classroom”180 such that a 
teacher may only discuss well known issues or opinions. The 
“workplace efficiency” element is also inappropriate because it 
                                                 
172 See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
173 Id. at 366-67. 
174 Id. 370-71. 
175 See id. at 373 (Luttig, J. dissenting). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 371 (Wilkinson, J. concurring). 
178 See id. at 378-79 (Motz, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County 
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). 
179 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J. dissenting). 
180 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
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focuses on the effect of the speech on fellow teachers rather than 
students.181 For example, because drug legalization is a hotly debated 
topic it is certainly a matter of public concern. If an elementary school 
teacher raises this topic in class it should not prevent other teachers 
from teaching their students. Accordingly, under Pickering a teacher 
may discuss the merits of drug legalization in an elementary school 
class.182 The Pickering test was simply not designed for teacher 
classroom speech because it does not account for the fact that 
classroom speech involves young students.183 
If the Seventh Circuit had applied Pickering, it would have likely 
concluded that Mayer’s speech was protected. It would have to 
conclude that the war in Iraq is a matter of public concern.184 It would 
next have to apply the Pickering balancing test, which weighs Mayer’s 
free speech interest against the school’s interest as an employer.185 
Because the school board did not bring forth any evidence that 
Mayer’s comments hurt teacher efficiency or the workplace 
environment, the court would be hard pressed to rule that Mayer’s 
speech was not protected.  
 
                                                 
181 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J. dissenting). 
182 See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051.  
183 See Daly, supra note 3, at 52; Emily Holmes Davis, Note and Recent 
Development, Protecting the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The First Amendment and 
Public School Teachers' Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 335, 361-64 
(2005); Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (2006).  
184 The parties agreed as much. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp 
(Mayer I), 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26137, at *1, *33 (S.D. 
Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
185 The district court avoided this step by ignoring the “public concern” part of 
the Pickering test, and ruling that Mayer was speaking as a public employee, rather 
than a private citizen. Id. at *39. 
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C. The Hazelwood Legitimate Pedagogical Concern Test 
 
Four circuits apply Hazelwood to teacher classroom speech.186 
Unfortunately, none offers reasons for this preference. Although 
Hazelwood dealt with student speech, it is the Supreme Court’s most 
recent case dealing with classroom speech. 187 Unlike Pickering, it 
accounts for school boards’ needs to protect students from 
inappropriate material.188 
Under Hazelwood, a school could prevent a student from 
expressing disapproval of the war in Iraq if it had a legitimate 
pedagogical reason.189 The Supreme Court designed this test to 
balance the speaker’s right to self expression against the school’s need 
to protect students from speech “inconsistent with ‘the shared values 
of a civilized social order.’”190 When a teacher speaks in the classroom 
the same conflict of interests arises.191 
The Fourth Circuit has criticized courts applying Hazelwood to 
teacher classroom speech because these courts force judges to monitor 
school board decisions.192 This result is un-democratic because judges 
must determine what a “pedagogical concern” is rather than the school 
board.193 The Fourth Circuit’s argument ignores the fact that courts 
already monitor school board decisions. In Hazelwood, the Supreme 
                                                 
186 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 
723 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 755-79 (10th Cir. 1991). 
187 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-274 (1988). 
188 See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1014 (asserting that Courts apply Hazelwood to 
teacher classroom speech because it better recognizes the interests of the state as 
educator, while Pickering focuses on the state as employer). 
189 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72. 
190 Id. at 272 (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).  
191 See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1014-15 (explaining why the Hazelwood test is 
an appropriate test for teacher classroom speech). 
192 See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 
1998) (Wilkinson, J. concurring). 
193 See id. 
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Court rejected the argument that courts can never interfere with school 
boards’ curricular decisions; a school board must justify any curricular 
decision with some legitimate pedagogical reason.194 It should not 
matter if a curricular decision is challenged by a student or a teacher. 
The Supreme Court was likely motivated by the belief that unbounded 
discretion to school boards is far more dangerous than occasionally 
forcing schools to justify curricular decisions.195 
Suppose a school board decided that all teachers must teach 
creation science rather than evolution, and it fired a teacher and 
expelled a student for discussing evolution in the classroom.196 The 
teacher and student sue. In this case, the Fourth Circuit would reach a 
bizarre result. It would invalidate the school board’s curricular 
decision because it violated the Establishment clause,197 and would 
reinstate the student because the school board violated his First 
Amendment right to expression.198 Nonetheless, it would uphold the 
school board’s decision to fire the teacher because it would be un-
democratic to monitor school board decisions.199 There is no 
principled reason for not applying Hazelwood uniformly and avoiding 
this bizarre result. 
Under Hazelwood, the Seventh Circuit would probably conclude 
that the school board violated Mayer’s rights. The court would 
probably explain that a school board may prevent teachers from 
expressing political opinions in the classroom because the Supreme 
Court has stated that schools may refuse to sponsor speech that 
“associate[s] the school with any position other than neutrality on 
matters of political concern.”200 The Seventh Circuit has interpreted 
                                                 
194 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
195 See id. (explaining that although educators, not judges, should educate the 
nation’s youth, courts may still need to intervene to protect First Amendment rights). 
196 This hypothetical is based on Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
197 See id. at 596-97. 
198 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
199 See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 
1998) (Wilkinson, J. concurring). 
200 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. 
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this language to mean that a school can maintain neutrality by 
censoring controversial viewpoints in school-sponsored speech.201 
Nonetheless, because there is no evidence that the school board gave 
Mayer prior notice that she could not express her opinion, it could not 
fire her. If she had later expressed a similar controversial opinion the 
school board could have fired her. 
 
D. Distinguishing Piggee 
 
The Mayer Court could have decided not to distinguish Piggee.202 
The court based its distinction on the fact that Piggee was not hired to 
preach against homosexuality, but Mayer was hired to discuss current 
events.203 While this distinction is factually accurate, giving it legal 
significance leads to bizarre results.  
Because Mayer expressed her disapproval of the war in Iraq 
during a current events class, her speech is categorically 
unprotected.204 Suppose Mayer had expressed her opinion during math 
class. Since Mayer’s opinion was outside the scope of her duty to 
teach math, her speech would not be categorically unprotected.205 The 
court would have to apply the Piggee test: the school could punish her 
only if her opinion was “nongermane” speech that “impede[d] the 
school’s educational mission.”206 Because her comments were very 
brief and not overbearing, a court might conclude that her speech 
should be protected.207 This result would be especially bizarre if 
Mayer actually taught both classes—she could opine on the war in the 
morning during math class, but she will be fired if she opines on the 
                                                 
201 See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that schools can suppress some viewpoints). 
202 Piggee v. Sandburg, 464 F.3d 667 (2006). 
203 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 480 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
204 See id. 
205 See id. at 480 (explaining that Garcetti did not apply in Piggee because the 
teacher was discussing an unassigned topic). 
206 See Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672. 
207 See id. 
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war in the afternoon during current events class. The court could have 
avoided this situation if it had consistently applied either the Piggee or 
Hazelwood test, i.e. explain that the school must provide a legitimate 
pedagogical reason for firing Mayer regardless of whether the speech 
occurred in math class or current events class.  
 
E. Other Tests 
 
Commentators have offered several different tests which the 
Mayer could have applied. While these tests have less support from 
case law, there may be policy reasons for adopting one of these tests. 
Walter Kuhn has proposed a hybrid Pickering/Hazelwood test that 
is designed to maximize protection afforded to teachers.208 
Restrictions on process are evaluated under Hazelwood, and 
restrictions on content are evaluated under Pickering.209 For example, 
Mayer’s decision to discuss the war in Iraq was a content based 
decision so the school can only punish her for the speech if it does not 
touch on a matter of public concern. Since the war in Iraq is a matter 
of public concern, the school could not punish the speech. Mayer’s 
structuring of the class consists of process decisions which the school 
may punish if it has a legitimate pedagogical reason. Kuhn’s test has 
two main problems: the distinction between content and process 
restrictions is frequently vague,210 and it is far too deferential too 
teachers. If the Seventh Circuit adopted the test, it would have to 
reverse Webster and rule that teachers may refuse to teach content 
specified in the curriculum so long as they discuss other content which 
touches upon matters of public concern.211  
Karen Daly has proposed a more moderate mixed procedural-
substantive test which accounts for the amount of notice school boards 
                                                 
208 See Kuhn, supra note 61, at 1020-21. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1023.  
211 See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
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provide to teachers.212 When a school has explicitly prohibited specific 
speech, the teacher has no protected right to engage in that speech. 
When a school has explicitly authorized specific speech, the teacher is 
immunized from action. In the great majority of cases where notice is 
ambiguous, courts should apply a modified Hazelwood test.213  
When a reasonable teacher should have known that the school 
board has prohibited certain speech, courts should presume that the 
school board has a legitimate pedagogical reason for prohibiting the 
speech.214 When a reasonable teacher would expect certain speech to 
be protected, the judicial presumption would shift in favor of the 
teacher. The school can rebut this presumption by presenting evidence 
that the speech had no educational purpose, or had a detrimental effect 
on students’ Constitutional rights.215 This test might also be too 
deferential to teachers. By categorically protecting approved teacher 
speech this test prevents school boards from re-evaluating decisions. 
 
V. WHY MAYER SHOULD HAVE APPLIED HAZELWOOD 
 
Under Mayer, public schools now have carte blanche to fire any 
teacher who expresses an unpopular opinion.216 This is a very 
powerful tool for protecting children from inappropriate material. 
Unfortunately, this tool is unnecessary and creates numerous practical 
problems.217  
The court applied Garcetti because it wanted to ensure that school 
boards, not teachers or judges, make decisions about the school 
curriculum. However, this concern does not justify a per se rule that 
teacher classroom speech is unprotected. If the school had also 
suspended a student for discussing the war in Iraq in class, the court 
                                                 
212 See Daly, supra note 3, at 53-54. 
213 Id. at 54-55. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp (Mayer II), 474 F.3d 477, 
480 (7th Cir. 2007). 
217 See supra sec. III. 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
794 
would evaluate whether this constraint on student speech is justified 
under Hazelwood, i.e. a judge would evaluate whether the school 
board had a legitimate pedagogical reason for censoring discussion of 
the war in Iraq.218 Thus, Mayer provides no added immunity to school 
boards, it just encourages students to challenge school board decisions 
rather than teachers.219 The Seventh Circuit has created no benefit for 
school boards, but it has created numerous problems for teachers, 
students, and schools as outlined above in Section III.  
Because Garcetti and Pickering dealt with significantly different 
concerns, the Seventh Circuit should not have applied that line of 
cases in Mayer. The court should have maintained its earlier 
distinction between teacher employee speech which is evaluated under 
the Pickering line,220 and teacher classroom speech which is evaluated 
under Hazelwood.221  
This approach avoids the numerous problems created by a per se 
rule against protecting classroom speech.222 In addition, the 
Hazelwood test more appropriately balances parents’ interests in 
protecting students from inappropriate material, and teachers’ interests 
in protecting their First Amendment rights.223 Although it may import 
some judicial oversight into school boards’ curricular decisions, the 
modest requirements of the test should not be burdensome.  
Furthermore, the court should consider the amount of notice 
provided to teachers regarding prohibited speech.224 While there is 
                                                 
218 See note 196 and accompanying text. 
219 The next case in this line may be brought by a student claiming a First 
Amendment right to hear from and discuss with a teacher. See Daly, supra note 3, at 
31 (discussing the concept of a student’s right to hear). 
220 See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F. 3d 878 (7th Cir. 2003); Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. 
of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1996). 
221 Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
222 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
223 See Daly, supra note 3, at 53. 
224 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Daly, supra note 3, at 
53. 
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little case law to support Karen Daly’s shifting presumption test, 
courts should consider notice when evaluating schools’ pedagogical 
concerns.225 Some notice to teachers is prima facie evidence that the 
school does in fact have a legitimate pedagogical interest in censoring 
the speech. When the school retaliates without any prior notice, as in 
Mayer’s case, the school will probably have a more difficult time 
explaining its pedagogical interest. 
Under this approach, the court should have remanded the case to 
the trial court to determine if the school had a legitimate pedagogical 
interest in terminating Mayer. While the school may have strong 
arguments to support its decision, the Seventh Circuit should require 
the school to explain them in court. Mayer and her students are at least 
entitled to know why the short classroom discussion was so devious 




The Seventh Circuit has overruled the balance struck in Webster v. 
New Lenox between a teacher’s rights and a school board’s power to 
control the curriculum. While its opinion is literally consistent with 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, it completely ignores the fact that discussions 
between teachers and students are very different from discussions 
between fellow employees. Mayer v. Monroe is so deferential to 
school boards that few teachers will even attempt to challenge school 
board decisions in the future. Thus, the Seventh Circuit will probably 
not have an opportunity to revisit this decision any time soon. In the 
meantime, teachers in the Seventh Circuit will have to shed the 
freedom of speech at the classroom door. 
                                                 
225 See Daly, supra note 3, at 53. 
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